
Record group profitability and faster AWS growth stood out in Amazon’s results, released after the market closed on 29 October. Structurally, the report resembled Google’s. Revenue at AWS climbed 39.3% year over year to $45.98 billion, extending its run of accelerating growth to a sixth consecutive quarter. With operating income increasing approximately 55% year over year to $17.773 billion, the division’s operating margin expanded from 34.6% a year earlier to 38.7%. Across the group, operating income came in at $28.076 billion and the operating margin hit a company record of 13.9%.

Those results nevertheless failed to win over the market. At $77.26 billion, quarterly purchases of property and equipment were more than twice the year-earlier $35.1 billion and over 34% ahead of analysts’ estimate of approximately $58.7 billion. Over the past twelve months, free cash flow turned negative at $42.357 billion, compared with positive $14.788 billion a year earlier. As recently as the end of the second quarter, the deficit had been $7.6 billion, so the shortfall widened by nearly fivefold in just one quarter. Management further signalled that spending would “increase significantly” in 2027.
A day earlier, Google had presented a similar picture. Its second successive quarter of negative free cash flow produced a deficit of $9.07 billion, considerably worse than the expected negative $2.7 billion. Projections put full-year 2026 free cash flow at negative $12.62 billion, while Goldman Sachs estimates a negative $40.57 billion for 2027. In the following session, the shares closed 13% lower, recording their steepest single-day fall since listing.
Both reports fed the “AI cash burn” narrative, with free cash flow turning negative in each case. A repeat of the same share-price outcome, however, would require sufficient similarity in both the sources of the cash flow deficits and the assets available to absorb them. A closer examination shows that the resemblance is largely narrative-driven. The differences that matter for valuation emerge from the composition of the figures.
Difference One: What Does the “Slope of Deterioration” Reveal?
In absolute terms, Amazon’s negative $42.4 billion looks more troubling: it is nearly five times Google’s quarterly deficit of $9.07 billion. Yet the market values free cash flow on more than the scale of a shortfall. It also distinguishes between a single spending surge and an enduring deterioration.
The negative $42.4 billion reported by Amazon covers the trailing twelve months. Two quarter-end readings illustrate the change: trailing-twelve-month free cash flow moved from negative $7.6 billion at the close of the second quarter to negative $42.4 billion at the close of the third. That additional quarterly shortfall of $34.8 billion accompanied a rise in quarterly capital expenditure from $35.1 billion a year earlier to $77.26 billion. Concentrated purchases of AI infrastructure accounted for almost all of the $42.16 billion year-over-year increase. The change therefore reflects a concentrated increase in capital expenditure, not a weakening of operating cash flow itself. Indeed, trailing-twelve-month operating cash flow grew 29% year over year to $168.3 billion, showing that the operating business continues to expand its cash-generating capacity.
At Google, the trajectory is more worrying. After two consecutive quarters below zero, its free cash flow deficit has widened from $5.855 billion in the second quarter to $9.065 billion in the third. Rather than a single step-change, the deterioration is continuing and intensifying each quarter. Crucially, operating cash flow also declined 13%, from $48.4 billion a year earlier to $42.3 billion. Its operating business is thus generating less cash at the same time as capital expenditure doubles. Amazon’s rising operating cash flow has been overtaken by the surge in capital expenditure; Google is adding higher capital expenditure to a cash base that is already shrinking.
For valuation, that distinction matters. Amazon’s challenge is “spending too quickly,” whereas Google’s is “earning less while simultaneously spending more.” Reversing the latter’s sustained negative cash flow is more difficult over the short term.
Difference Two: How Certain Is Future Revenue?
AWS’s order backlog received less attention than it deserved amid Amazon’s 7% after-hours fall. On the earnings call, CEO Jassy said the backlog had risen to $578 billion from $496 billion at the end of the second quarter, delivering triple-digit year-over-year growth. This backlog comprises signed contracts for which revenue has not yet been recognised. It is important not as “money already earned,” but as a measure of future revenue visibility. Where investors view capital expenditure as “spending without an anchor,” those contracts supply the anchor.
Against quarterly capital expenditure of $77.26 billion, the $578 billion backlog amounts to 7.5 quarters of spending. Jassy’s outlook went further: he said AWS growth would surpass 40% in both 2027 and 2028, and annual revenue could exceed $1 trillion within the next five to ten years. He also highlighted the pace of deployment. On average, the company installs an AI accelerator every 14 seconds, with customers taking up capacity almost immediately after installation. Through 2028, AWS capacity is “largely sold out.”
Google Cloud also has a sizeable backlog of $561 billion, representing 256% year-over-year growth. It nevertheless trails AWS’s backlog, while its operating income of $11.1 billion is substantially below AWS’s $17.773 billion. The more important distinction is that growth in Google’s core advertising business has decelerated for three consecutive quarters, reducing its ability to fund capital expenditure through internal cash flow from other operations. Amazon’s retail and advertising operations are slowing too, but North American retail operating income rose 82% year over year to $8.723 billion, producing an operating margin of 7.7%. International operating income increased from $1.199 billion a year earlier to $1.580 billion. Retail is therefore not shrinking; it is delivering more profit despite slower revenue growth.
Difference Three: Can Amazon’s Retail “Cushion” Absorb the Pressure?
Growth in online store sales slowed to just 2% year over year, the weakest pace since early 2023, with sales reaching $68.47 billion. Advertising revenue increased 11% to $19.64 billion, missing the market forecast of $20.82 billion and posting its slowest growth since separate reporting began in 2020. The shift of Prime Day from the third quarter to the second explains part of the slowdown. By Amazon’s own estimate, third-quarter revenue growth would have been approximately four percentage points higher without that timing effect. Advertising growth in the fourth quarter is expected to recover to nearly 20%.
Profitability in North American retail, however, tells a different story. Operating income climbed 82%, from $4.789 billion a year earlier to $8.723 billion, and the operating margin reached 7.7%. Profits grew much faster than revenue, which increased 6%, pointing to better retail unit economics. CFO Olszewski said that higher fuel costs and linehaul rates had pushed transportation costs up 11% year over year. Even so, improved inventory placement, shorter transport distances and package consolidation are reducing the cost of serving each unit, which remains on course for a fourth consecutive annual decline. Jassy added that the fulfilment network now deploys more than one million robots, already contributing meaningfully to productivity gains and lower operating costs.
There is no comparable structure at Google. Search advertising growth eased from 19% in the first quarter to 17% in the second and then 12% in the third. That makes three consecutive quarters of slower growth, with the slowdown becoming sharper. As its core advertising operation loses momentum, Google has no retail division combining “low revenue growth and high profit growth” to act as an internal cash buffer.
What Could Shape Amazon’s Share Price Tomorrow?
The fourth-quarter outlooks accompanying the two reports point to distinct risks. Google’s revenue outlook was not what unsettled investors. Instead, concerns centred on whether its capital expenditure and cash flow were sustainable, a supply-side risk arising from its investment choices. Amazon introduced a separate uncertainty through its fourth-quarter guidance. It projected revenue of $240 billion to $247 billion, whose midpoint falls short of the market estimate of $244.5 billion. Operating income guidance of $28.5 billion to $33.5 billion implies a $31 billion midpoint, below analysts’ forecast of approximately $33 billion. Investors have focused on the possibility that “holiday-season consumption may fall short of expectations.”
When trading begins tomorrow, Amazon will therefore face two overlapping market narratives. The first, “AI capital expenditure consuming cash flow,” matches Google’s. The second, “marginal weakening in consumer demand,” does not apply to Google. How the two interact remains uncertain. After the open, investors may conclude that the retail slowdown is mainly a consequence of Prime Day’s rescheduling and other timing effects. Fourth-quarter advertising growth guidance of nearly 20% itself offers a counterweight. In that case, the consumer narrative would partly recede and valuation would move closer to reflecting the AI cash flow story. Should later data instead establish consumer weakness as a lasting trend, the two narratives would reinforce one another, potentially taking the fall beyond the initial 7% after-hours move.
On balance, Amazon will not replicate Google’s full 13% fall when the market opens tomorrow. Google’s sell-off priced in four factors together: “two consecutive quarters of negative free cash flow, shrinking operating cash flow, three consecutive quarters of slowing search advertising growth, and guidance for further capital expenditure expansion.” Amazon displays two and a half of those factors. Its cash flow deficit is larger in absolute terms, but operating cash flow continues to rise and a sustained sequence of negative readings across multiple quarters has yet to emerge. With a $578 billion backlog and quarterly operating income of $17.773 billion, AWS supplies a profit anchor on a scale unavailable at Google Cloud. Year-over-year growth of 82% in North American retail profit has strengthened the buffer, although consumer demand and timing factors are narrowing its coverage. Weak fourth-quarter consumer guidance adds a variable absent from Google’s situation. This complicates Amazon’s valuation while also setting it apart. Investors must weigh “visibility into AI returns” against “short-term noise in consumer demand,” rather than confront Google’s more direct twin pressure on “cash flow and the core business”.
Taken together, this week’s successive reports confirm a deeper change in how the market assigns value. AI capital expenditure is shifting from “fuel for growth” to “a burden with uncertain returns,” and investors are now applying that framework beyond a single company. Amazon nevertheless retains two advantages Google lacks: $578 billion in signed orders and quarterly retail profit of $8.7 billion. Its 7% after-hours fall indicates that investors recognise the mismatch but have not yet excluded those two advantages entirely from their valuation. The decisive test arrives in the fourth quarter. If the AWS backlog starts translating into revenue at a growth rate above 40% and retail profit margins hold above 7% after the holiday season, the present 7% discount will be reconsidered. Conversely, if persistently negative free cash flow deteriorates further in the fourth quarter and signs of weak consumer demand move from “timing noise” to evidence of a trend, those valuation supports will be removed one after another.